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ARTICLES
THE FALL AND RISE OF PROFESSIONALISM
Thomas D. Morgan*
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an increasing concern among law-
yers that the legal profession may be declining in "professional-
ism." Professionalism is not a self-defining term; indeed, it is
greatly overused today. There are professional football players,
professional models and even professional wrestlers. The question,
then, is what it means to be a professional for purposes of trying to
decide whether lawyers are more professional or less professional
than before. Although several definitions might be offered, I would
assert that traditional professions seem to have at least three
attributes.1
First, professional skills are intellectual in character and result
from an extended period of training. That distinguishes "profes-
sions," as used in this article, from professional wres-
tlers-wrestlers may have some training, but it is not usually in
intellectual skills. Second, professional services are, in general, be-
yond assessment by a typical client. In other words, the people
who consult these professionals are unable to distinguish and eval-
uate well the service rendered by the professional. Third, profes-
sional concerns transcend the problems of particular individuals.
The professions historically have been institutions that have had
some element about them that is beyond the purely private trans-
acting of day-to-day activity. This element recognizes that the pro-
fessional's work has a significance to the society as a whole.
* Professor of Law, Emory University; B.A., 1962, Northwestern University; J.D., 1965,
University of Chicago.
This article is adapted from a speech presented in a Symposium on Legal Ethics at T. C.
Williams School of Law on November 16, 1984. Since that symposium, Professor Morgan
has been appointed Reporter to the A.B.A. Commission on Professionalism. The views ex-
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1. See Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARv. L. REv.
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There has not been a significant change in either of the first two
characteristics of professionalism as applied to lawyers. Law still
requires an extended period of study and is primarily intellectual.
The law continues to be sufficiently mysterious that clients gener-
ally do not understand it without the lawyer's help. It is the third
characteristic-the sense of professional concerns which transcend
problems of particular individuals-which has undergone signifi-
cant change.
The focus of this article is upon this third element of "profes-
sionalism." As an institution, a group of individuals with a com-
mon calling, we as lawyers seem to be losing a sense of ourselves as
trustees of a tradition of justice, a tradition which is important in
preserving a sense of social unity. The lawyer's role in this tradi-
tion is as important as his or her role in protecting the rights of
individual clients. This is not an argument against representing cli-
ents, but many lawyers seem to have come close to a point where
they emphasize the short-range concerns and rights of their clients
to the exclusion of everything else. Unfortunately, this often seems
to be the case because it is in a lawyer's best interest to do so. I
believe that it is because of lawyers' preoccupation with the desires
of the client, to the exclusion of all else, that lawyers have been
experiencing a period of decline in professionalism-a decline
which has been going on for at least fifteen or twenty years. This
article will briefly examine this decline. It will, however, also sug-
gest some hopeful signs that the legal profession may be moving
toward an enhanced sense of professional calling.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM
It is always dangerous to try to recall the good old days that
never were, but contemplate the following principle which our
forebearer lawyers were asked to affirm: "I will never plead the
Statute of Limitations when based on the mere [passage] of time;
for if my client is conscious that he owes the debt, and has no
other defense than the legal bar, he shall never make me a partner
in his knavery."2 That message, and certainly the rhetoric, seem
strange. It represents, however, the view of a preeminent American
lawyer one hundred fifty years ago. The lawyer, David Hoffman,
was among the first to try to articulate, in a systematic way, the
professional standards that existed in the legal profession.
2. D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 754 (2d ed. 1846).
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Hoffman's perspective on lawyers and the pressures they felt led
him to conclude:
What is wrong is not the less so from being common. And though
few dare to be singular, even in a right cause, I am resolved to make
my own, and not the conscience of others, my sole guide. What is
morally wrong cannot be professionally right, however it may be
sanctioned by time or custom. It is better to be right with a few, or
even none, than wrong, though with a multitude. If, therefore, there
be among my brethren any traditional moral errors of practice, they
shall be studiously avoided by me, though in so doing I unhappily
come in collision with what is (erroneously, I think) too often de-
nominated the "policy of the profession." Such cases, fortunately,
occur but seldom, but, when they do, I shall trust to that moral
firmness of purpose which shrinks from no consequences, and which
can be intimidated by no authority, however ancient or respectable.3
Mr. Hoffman was not alone in his views. George Sharswood of
Philadelphia, following Hoffman by twenty years, said:
Always seek to have a clear understanding of your object: be sure it
is honest and right, and then march directly to it. The covert, indi-
rect, and insidious way of doing anything is always the wrong way. It
gradually hardens the moral faculties, renders obtuse the perception
of right and wrong in human actions, and weighs everything in the
balances of worldly policy ... It may be going too far to say that it
is ever advisable to expose the weakness of your client's cause to an
adversary, who may be unscrupulous in taking advantage of it; but,
it may be safely said, that he who sits down deliberately to plot a
surprise upon his opponent, and which he knows can succeed only
by its being a surprise, deserves to fall, and in all probability will
fall, into the trap which his own hands have laid.4
These are demanding ideas and, admittedly, probably not every
lawyer 100 to 150 years ago adhered to them. What is important
for us to see, however, is that Hoffman conveys an overt sense that
lawyers have a calling higher than, or certainly different than, the
individualistic concerns of each given client. Sharswood, too, con-
veys the idea that a lawyer is somehow different than just a "hired
gun" or "mouthpiece" for a particular client who engages his or her
services.
3. Id. at 765.
4. G. SHARSWOOD, PRonssIoNAL ETmcs 96-97 (1854).
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The same ideas were reflected in influential codes of ethics
adopted later. The Alabama Code, the first to directly articulate
enforceable standards for lawyers, reflected such ideas and pro-
vided that:
Nothing has been more potential in creating and pandering to popu-
lar prejudice against lawyers as a class, and in withholding from the
profession the full measure of public esteem and confidence which
belong to the proper discharge of its duties, than the false claim,
often set up by the unscrupulous in defense of questionable transac-
tions, that it is an attorney's duty to do everything to succeed in the
client's cause.
An attorney "owes entire devotion to the interest of his client,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his cause, and the ex-
ertion of the utmost skill and ability," to the end that nothing may
be taken or withheld from him, save by the rules of law, legally ap-
plied. . . . Nevertheless, it is steadfastly to be borne in mind that
the great trust is to be performed within and not without the
bounds of the law which creates it. The attorney's office does not
destroy man's accountability to the Creator, or loosen the duty of
obedience to law, and the obligation to his neighbor; and it does not
permit, much less demand, violation of law, or any manner of fraud
or chicanery, for the client's sake.'
That canon of ethics was adopted by an official bar association
less than 100 years ago. As recently as sixteen years ago, in 1969,
before the adoption of what is now thought of as the "traditional"
Code of Professional Responsibility, law students and lawyers were
told:
No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause,
civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive nor should
any lawyer render any service or advice involving disloyalty to the
law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judicial office, which
we are bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or persons ex-
ercising a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of
the public. When rendering any such improper service or advice, the
lawyer invites and merits stern and just condemnation. Correspond-
ingly, he advances the honor of his profession and the best interests
of his client when he renders service or gives advice tending to im-
5. ALA. CODE OF ETHICS Canon 10 (1887), reprinted in 118 Ala. XXVI-XXVII (1897).
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press upon the client and his undertaking exact compliance with the
strictest principles of moral law. . . . But above all a lawyer will
find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private
trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and
loyal citizen.6
Throughout our history, then, demands have been placed on
American lawyers which transcend the lawyers' responsibilities to
the short-run interests of the client. The demands were expressed
almost 150 years ago and have continued to be expressed almost to
the present day. Recent attitudes about professional ethics-new
codes and statements of rules governing lawyers-must be ex-
amined against this backdrop.
III. RECENT CHANGES IN PROFESSIONALISM
The thrust of new codes of professional responsibility has been
to direct the conduct of lawyers in very precise and enforceable
language. This trend is well illustrated in Virginia's new Code of
Professional Responsibility.7 Unfortunately, what was lost in the
process of drafting these new codes was more than just hortatory
language about being nice to one's neighbor. What was lost was the
real call in the Canon of Ethics-the formal beacons for the profes-
sion-to go beyond the goal of solely representing and furthering
the interests of clients.
As an illustration of the precise language of recent codes, analyze
DR 7-107(H) of the ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility:
During the pendency of an administrative proceeding, a lawyer...
shall not make or participate in making a statement, other than a
quotation from or reference to public records, that a reasonable per-
son would expect to be disseminated by means of public communi-
cation if it is made outside the official course of the proceeding and
relates to:
(1) Evidence regarding the occurrence or transaction
involved.
(2) The character, credibility, or criminal record of a party,
6. CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 32 (1908) (emphasis added) [hereinafter cited
as CANONS].
7. VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983) [hereinafter cited as VA. C.P.R.].
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witness, or prospective witness.
(3) Physical evidence or the performance or results of any
examinations or tests or the refusal or failure of a party to sub-
mit to such.
(4) His opinion as to the merits of the claims, defenses, or
positions of an interested person.
(5) Any other matter reasonably likely to interfere with a
fair hearing.8
The language is precise, carefully tailored and enforceable. The
substance of the section is a sound minimum standard. Unfortu-
nately, the langugage is not uplifting and hardly calls a lawyer to a
sense of moral duty. There is little in this or any other of the disci-
plinary rules which calls lawyers to a standard of behavior that is
higher than the plumber or hairdresser who is licensed, or the pub-
lic utility which has a certificate of public convenience.
The ethical considerations of the Canons of Ethics are not much
different. Talked of as aspirational,9 they really do not aspire to
anything. For the most part, the ethical considerations merely re-
peat the disciplinary rules. Occasionally, ethical considerations
may state ideas not found in the disciplinary rules, but even these
different ideas do not call lawyers to a sense of moral purpose.
They do not articulate a sense that the lawyer is part of a voca-
tion-a calling which may involve issues significant to the future of
society itself.
If all that was wrong with new codes and statements of rules
governing lawyers was the fact that the language is dull, or that it
no longer contains the homilies of its predecessors, there would be
little cause for additional comment. It seems, however, that there
has been more than a change in rhetoric. The change in language
seems symptomatic of a much deeper phenomenon that has impor-
tant implications worthy of consideration.
The concern with the change in language is that the rules gov-
erning the professionalism of lawyers no longer reflect the tradi-
tions from which we have come. What we do as lawyers for a client
affects more than just a given transaction for that particular client
at that particular time. An attorney's actions can affect peo-
8. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-107 (1979).
9. Id. Preliminary Statement.
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pie-clients and others-and the way they relate to each other for
a period well into the future. The professional, often religious-
based concerns which required or suggested that a lawyer consider
the effect his or her role could have on the long-run welfare of soci-
ety were reflected in the predecessors of today's codes. Because of
the change in language, these concerns are no longer reflected. 10
This change, I suggest, has been a part of a shift within the profes-
sion away from the lawyer's obligations to society, a shift away
from professionalism and closer to the legal profession becoming
merely another regulated industry.
IV. WHY HAS THE APPROACH TO PROFESSIONALISM CHANGED?
Several reasons can be suggested for why the 1969 Model Code
was necessary and why it made the changes it did. First, the
change in rhetoric was an intentional reflection of the rights
revolution of the 1960's. As a result of that revolution, the stan-
dards required for taking away a lawyer's license had to be more
strict than they had been previously." Until about the 1960's, it
was not uncommon for lawyers to be disbarred based on a stan-
dard not much more specific than "conduct unbecoming a law-
yer. 1 2 In enforcing such an exceptionally broad standard, the gen-
eral attitude was that unethical conduct would be apparent when
it was seen.
In the 1960's, the attitude of the profession shifted. Lawyers had
to transform what had theretofore been a "cleaning our own
house" notion of the profession, to a notion that the lawyer basi-
10. The current code contains no provision which parallels Canon 32 of the 1908 Canons
of Professional Ethics. The only remaining language in today's code which suggests that the
lawyer consider the effect an action may have on society is found, not in the Canons, Ethical
Considerations or Disciplinary Rules, but in the Preamble to the Code. See MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSMILrrY Preamble (1979) ("[I]n the last analysis it is the desire for the
respect and confidence of the members of his profession and of the society which he serves
that should provide to a lawyer the incentive for the highest possible degree of ethical
conduct.").
11. See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (cannot deny bar admission for failure
to answer overbroad questions not legitimately related to the fitness to practice law); Cord
v. Gibb, 219 Va. 1019, 254 S.E.2d 71 (1979) (applicant's living with a man not her husband
not sufficient basis to deny admission to practice; irrelevant whether her conduct "would
lower the public's opinion of the Bar as a whole"). Although both of these are bar admission
cases, the standards they establish have been highly influential in setting disciplinary stan-
dards as well.
12. See generally Comment, Controlling Lawyers by Bar Associations and Courts, 5
HARv. CR-C.L. L. REv. 301 (1970) (discussing standards previously used in controlling a
lawyer's admission to the bar and subsequent conduct).
1985]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
cally had a right to be in business.1 3 Lawyers became systematic
about due process and transformed the substantive standards to
reflect that change in view. Other substantive changes were made,
in large part, as a protective measure. Bar associations in general,
and the Virginia Bar in particular, were frequent targets for law
suits. Some bar activities which should not have been undertaken
had been justified in the name of professionalism.14 Both rhetoric
and standards of conduct were changed, largely out of a fear that
the prior standards would result in additional costly law suits.
The multistate bar exam unfortunately helps to enforce this
view of ethics as only specified minimum standards. Many states
require all candidates for the bar to take the Multistate Profes-
sional Responsibility Examination (MPRE) that requires them to
know in great detail the text of the Code of Professional Responsi-
bility.15 One needs to know the phrase in a particular disciplinary
rule or ethical consideration that applies to the particular situa-
tion. Nothing in the study for the multistate bar exam requires a
student to think for a moment of himself or herself as a profes-
sional and what he or she would do in a real-life professional situa-
tion. The MPRE requires and drives students to think of them-
selves as people subject to a code much like the Internal Revenue
Code. As a result, many students become people who know the law
of professional ethics but do not have any richer sense of them-
selves as professionals. They are less likely, not more, to be driven
by some kind of inner conscience.
The second main cause for the decline in professionalism seems
to be the growth in the number of lawyers. This observation is not
to criticize that growth, but simply to say that one of the conse-
quences of rapid and massive growth is that professionalism tends
to be a casualty. As recently as 1970, the nation had about 350,000
practicing lawyers. Today, there are about 650,000.16 Even at
13. In Baird, the Supreme Court expressly recognized that "[t]he practice of law is not a
matter of grace, but of right for one who is qualified by his learning and moral character."
401 U.S. at 8.
14. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (Bar cannot prohibit attorneys from
advertising in a newspaper if advertisement is not false or misleading); Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975) (Bar Association's publication of a minimum fee schedule
violates antitrust laws); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1
(1964) (Bar cannot prohibit organizations from channeling claims of its members to a select
group of lawyers).
15. As of 1984, 24 states required that applicants take the MPRE. See ABA, COMPREHEN-
sIvE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 20-21 (1984).
16. It is difficult to state this number precisely, but there were estimated to be 585,000
[Vol. 19:451
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350,000 lawyers, most major cities had 2000 or 3000 lawyers and
smaller cities had several hundred. Now the numbers are much,
much larger. This can be contrasted with England, for example,
where the whole country has under 5000 barristers. 17 Even that is a
fairly significant number for them. But one reason the British can
enforce a higher standard of professional behavior, at least in their
trial bar, may be because they do have this smaller body.
When many lawyers know each other and expect to see each
other again, they remember an act of misconduct or unprofessional
behavior for a period well into the future. This results in a kind of
informal discipline that causes people to recognize that it is impor-
tant to adhere not only to the letter of the rules but to a substan-
tially higher standard. Today, by contrast a lawyer can be dis-
barred and found later still practicing law."' The disbarred
attorney can be in an area in which he essentially never sees the
same opponent twice. No one knows who he is. The judges do not
know him. He goes from court to court and handles a variety of
different kinds of cases, and nobody ever bothers to check up on
him. In short, the bar in some areas has so many lawyers that it
has become increasingly difficult to take serious note of the decline
in the professional conduct of any given individual.
A third reason for this decline in professionalism may be that
the rewards of success today are so high for the really successful
practitioners that there is very little incentive to invest one's time
in issues that transcend the private client. This is not a call for
lower lawyer income. Certainly, many lawyers in this country have
incomes that are not remarkable by any means. The point is that
the rewards of really successful practice in the profession, and the
ease with which that success can be lost, create a tremendous drive
toward stretching every point and pursuing every advantage to
demonstrate to clients that they are receiving services which are
better than the service the people down the street (who will hap-
lawyers in 1985. In addition, law schools will graduate about 35,000 potential new lawyers
each year. See Taylor, Demographics of the American Legal Profession, in TiE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION. RESPONSmILrrY AND REGULATION 48 (G. Hazard & D. Rhode eds. 1985).
17. SENATE OF THE INNS OF COURT AND TnE BAR, 1982-83 ANNUAL STATEMENT 95.
18. For some reported examples of this occurring, see In re Peterson, 274 N.W.2d 922
(Minn. 1979) (disbarred attorney denied readmission to the bar, in part, because of his re-
peated instances of practicing law and holding himself out as a lawyer while disbarred);
Hoots v. State ex rel. OkIa. Bar Ass'n, 486 P.2d 722 (0kla. 1971) (attorney denied reinstate-
ment to the bar because he practiced law while disbarred); In re Easler, 275 S.C. 400, 272
S.E.2d 32 (1980) (attorney found in contempt of court for practicing law after disbarred).
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pily take their case) can provide. Again, there is nothing wrong
with high quality lawyering. However, the sense of professionalism
can be expected to be reduced as the cost of engaging in profes-
sional activity goes up. The economists call this an opportunity
cost. If one engages in more professional activity and that causes
the loss of a key client or brings about less per hour to the firm,
that loss is perceived as a price tag on professionalism. As the price
becomes higher in today's increasingly competitive market, one
would expect to see an incentive at least to have the amount of
professionalism reduced.
Related to this point, the financial pressures in the practice of
law today are such that one often cannot afford to look beyond the
short-range and the practical. Mergers and division of firms are oc-
curring throughout the country seemingly every week. It is not un-
common today to find a situation in which a respected professional
in a firm, an individual who has invested hundreds of hours in bar
association and civic activities, is basically run out of his firm by a
group of the other partners who want a marginally larger share of
the pie than they would get if this "unproductive individual" re-
mained. Of course there may be many other factors in such situa-
tions which are not brought to light. However, even the suggestion
that this has happened may bring home to some lawyers the per-
sonal cost of "too much" professionalism. There is such a premium
on bringing in the hours, and bringing in the clients, that practic-
ing attorneys run the very real risk of losing a sense that lawyers
are trustees of a tradition which was given to them when they were
admitted to the bar and which they have to hand off at the end of
their careers.
But once again if all that is done is to decry this decline in pro-
fessionalism, such criticism may be a waste of time. Fortunately,
however, lawyers seem to be doing something about the problem.
V. THE TURN OF THE TIDE
I have a sense today that at least some lawyers are now taking
seriously, as individuals and as a group, the kinds of professional
concerns that perhaps many lawyers have been forgetting.
First, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct have recognized,
in a way the Code of Professional Responsibility did less well, that
a lawyer's obligations extend not only to the client, but also to the
legal system, and particularly to third parties who are affected by
[Vol. 19:451460
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the lawyer's behavior. In the Model Rules, for example, the lawyer
now has express obligations to third parties and even to one's op-
ponent l e -those individuals other than clients who are affected by
what the lawyer does and how he or she conducts the case.
Some of those issues were raised before,"0 but they are now
grouped together in Part 4 of the ABA Model Rules. The adoption
of those rules was not without debate and struggle, but the fact
that they have been recaptured in a national document seems sig-
nificant. The Virginia Bar rules are also impressive;21 particularly
in the areas of perjury disclosure or intention to commit a crime,22
the rules are courageous and not in the short-run interest of the
individual client. The rules also are not in the short-run interest of
the bar, assuming the bar is erroneously viewed as a place where
people pay big money to "get off."
Second, the Model Rules substantially increase the possibility of
using referral fees. 23 Granted, some people may doubt that this is
an increase in professionalism. Referral fees, however, are not nec-
essarily ambulance chasers' devices. One of the explanations for
the rapid growth in the size of law firms, for example, and the con-
sequent impersonality of law practice that has come about from
the 100, 200, or 500 member law firms, is the practical need to
combine a number of specialities under one roof. This kind of or-
ganizing allows a firm to provide full service to a client in a context
in which the primary lawyer does not have to feel insecure about
the ability to retain the client on the one hand, and to be fairly
compensated for the overall contribution that he or she makes to
the case, on the other hand. In the large firm, this compensation is
not calculated on a time records basis, but on some kind of reason-
19. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDUCT Rule 4.3 ("When the lawyer knows
or reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role
in the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.").
20. Some of the requirements found in Part 4 of the Model Rules are scattered through-
out the Disciplinary Rules embodied under the general terms of Canon 7 of the Code. For
example, Rule 4.4, which outlines the requirement that an attorney respect the rights of
third persons, finds its counterpart in DR 7-102, 7-106 and 7-108 of the Model Code.
21. Some of the improvement was accomplished by incorporating ideas from the Model
Rules, but several of the ideas or means of expression are original.
22. VA. CPR DR 4-101(C)-(D) are especially demanding.
23. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 1.5(e) (allowing a division of
fees without regard to the individual services performed, provided there is a "written agree-
ment with the client [and] each lawyer assumes joint responsibility for the representation")
with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-107(A) (requiring in all instances
that fee splitting be in proportion to the services performed by each lawyer).
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able division of the fee. One logical way to return to somewhat
smaller firms is to make it convenient and practical to share cases
between firms. A lawyer from firm A must be able to work out
some arrangement with a lawyer from firm B so that the two can
work on a case as if they were partners. Obviously, no lawyer
should refer a case to the highest bidder, but the adoption of Rule
1.5(e) in the Model Rules, and the corresponding provision in Vir-
ginia 4 which allow lawyers to reach more effectively accommoda-
tions of this kind, is an important move in the right direction.
Smaller law firms may well lead to greater personalization of law
practice and, with that, possibly a greater sense of personal profes-
sional responsibility.
Third, there has been an increasing tendency in this country for
lawyers to recognize the desirability, and indeed the necessity, of
using mediation and other dispute-resolution techniques instead of
treating matters as appropriate only for litigation. Many lawyers
have recognized these options for years and others have tended to
be pushed to them by the requirements of necessity. The fact that
there is this greater recognition on the part of many lawyers about
the importance to society of having fewer people pounding away at
each other at enormous costs, pain, bitterness, anger and time in
the litigation setting is a hopeful sign. Lawyers are acquiring a
broader sense of the consequences of their actions; they are not
just asking the question, "Do I make a bigger fee if I take this case
to trial than if I get the matter settled?"
Fourth, from the perspective of a writer in the area of legal eth-
ics, it is intriguing to see the demand for materials that ask more
than what the law is. Today it is very difficult to sell a case book
that does not contain at least an acknowledgement of the philo-
sophical and moral issues underlying a lawyer's decisions. Indeed,
Professors Geoffrey Hazard and Deborah Rhode have come out
with a book of nothing but history, philosophy, and economics.25
The book consists of a whole series of articles and readings on the
roles lawyers adopt and the implication of the decisions they make
on people they affect and on the society in which they live. The
point is, that professors and students around the country are de-
manding that when they study professional responsibility, they
study the broad topic of Ethics as well as the narrow area of legal
24. VA. C.P.R., supra note 7, DR 2-105(D).
25. See THE LEGAL PROFESSION: RESPONSIBILITY AND REGULATION (G. Hazard & D. Rhode
eds. 1985).
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ethics. Such a development is not going to change everybody's
moral sensibilities. It is not going to suddenly transform everybody
into a good person. On the other hand, the fact that people are
asking the kinds of questions that those materials raise seems to be
a genuinely important sign. As such questions become and con-
tinue to be important to lawyers, we will likely see a return to the
kind of professional awareness and sense of real calling that once
characterized the profession.
Of course, there still is some distance to go. Lawyers have by no
means reached the renaissance of the professionalism that was
called for in some of the quotations with which we began. There
still are several areas in which there is a real job to do.
VI. AREAS FOR IMPROVEMENT
One area in which lawyers must rethink the demands of profes-
sionalism involves mandatory pro bono activity. The requirement
was put forth in an early draft discussion of the Model Rules26 and
virtually "hooted" down. It was rejected in spite of the fact the
ABA House of Delegates had gone on record in favor of the con-
cept just five years earlier in 1975.2" As an abstract proposal it was
desirable; as a specific disciplinary requirement, it was unaccept-
able. There is a statement of the desirability of pro bono in the
Model Rules today,29 but nothing more.
The issues surrounding mandatory pro bono work are not easy.
There is a question of what would qualify as pro bono service.
Whether serving on a bar committee to study more efficient billing
practices would constitute pro bono services is the kind of issue
that people debate. What constitutes such service, whether every-
body should have to do it, whether lawyers should be able to sup-
port institutions serving public interest causes instead of doing the
work themselves, and by what authority a court can compel any-
body to engage in pro bono service are all real issues. Finally, the
question arises whether lawyers are behaving morally when doing
pro bono service because somebody told them they had to instead
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.1 (Discussion Draft 1980) (Rule
requiring an attorney to render pro bono public service).
27. See G. HAZARD & W. HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING 491-92 (1985).
28. See ABA SPECIAL CommITrEE ON PUBLIC INTEREST PRACTICE, IMPLEMENTING THE LAW-
YER'S PUBLIC INTEREST OBLIGATION (1977).
29. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983) ("A lawyer should
render public interest legal service.").
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of because they genuinely recognize the professional obligation to
do it. The debate, however, was symbolic of the question of
whether lawyers see it as part of their professional calling to be
part of something larger than a series of private economic transac-
tions. The conclusion must be that lawyers still have some distance
to go in this regard.
A second area in which a growth in professionalism is still
needed involves the debate over the duty or the right to disclose
planned client fraud. This was another area where at least the
ABA Model Rules failed to take a step that would have embodied
an obligation broader than to the client.8 0 The attorney-client priv-
ilege never has allowed a lawyer to withhold evidence of client
fraud, or at least it has never required it. 31 An attorney now can be
compelled, consistent with the attorney-client privilege, to answer
questions in court about client fraud. The only real issue for the
Model Rules was whether the lawyer could volunteer the fact that
his or her client was going to defraud somebody. At least the de-
bate on this issue lasted a little longer than the pro bono issue
generated, but the ABA finally defeated quite clearly the notion
that such disclosure could be voluntarily made.
Once again the question is not easy. The question of when the
lawyer knows a fraud is going to be committed is difficult. The
questions, "What do I do about it?," "Who do I tell?," and "How
do I prevent it?" are at least as hard. But once again there is a
symbolic character to the issue when lawyers say to themselves,
not that the issue is difficult and care must be taken in resolving
the dilemma, but instead say the duty is to the client and only to
the client no matter who gets hurt. Again, we as lawyers still have
some way to go in thinking about what our calling really is.
A third area in which growth in professionalism has been slow is
the American attitude on contingent fees. The contingent fee is a
practice that unquestionably has made it possible for some people
30. Rule 4.1 requires an attorney to disclose a material fact in order to avoid assisting a
client in a criminal or fraudulent act unless such disclosure is prohibited by the confidenti-
ality rules. The confidentiality rules allow voluntary disclosure in those instances where dis-
closure is reasonably believed to be necessary to prevent the client from committing a crimi-
nal act which may result in death or substantial bodily harm. See MODEL RULEs OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). As contained in the 1982 Revised Final Draft, this
rule would also have allowed voluntary disclosure if the client's conduct was fraudulent or
criminal, and if the conduct could have resulted in economic or property loss, as well as
serious personal injury or death. See id. Rule 1.6 (Revised Final Draft 1982).
31. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE: § 2298 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961).
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to maintain litigation they otherwise could not have maintained.
Unfortunately, it also helps contribute to a system in which litiga-
tion that probably never should have been brought is brought be-
cause it seems potentially profitable to the attorney filing the ac-
tion. Clients basically see that they have nothing to lose by filing a
case. Even though they may have some costs that theoretically
they are ultimately liable for, they expect that they will never have
to pay. Since the client has nothing to lose and the lawyer either
has some time on his or her hands or for some other reason thinks
the suit may be worth filing, it is likely that there are many suits in
the courts today that would not have been brought under a differ-
ent system. The results obtained ought to be and are a significant
factor in judging the reasonableness of attorney's fees.3 2 But a con-
tingent fee, ordinarily a fee in which the client has no down-side
risk, seemingly should not be allowed except in a very limited class
of cases in which it can actually be shown that the litigation has
some intrinsic merit and could not, in fact, be filed some other
way. People do not pay the full cost of litigating their cases.33
There is a whole court system that has been established by the
public for allowing legitimate grievances to be maintained. A sense
of professionalism must be developed which says that the court
system is not to be used if the parties involved are basically en-
gaged in long-shot litigation, hoping that victory in a few cases will
justify maintaining law suits in many situations in which they are
not likely to succeed.
VII. CONCLUSION
The question of whether or not we as lawyers are more or less
professional today than we used to be is an important one. It ap-
pears that for a significant period of time we have become less pro-
fessional. An increase in economic pressures, the understandable
desire and drive for due process in handling lawyer discipline
cases, and the very size of the profession itself have all tended to
push us more and more into an individualistic, self-protective style
of behaving.
On the other hand, there appears to be the beginning of a turn-
around, an increase in professionalism characterized by a greater
32. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDuCr Rule 1.5 (a)(4); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONsmILrrY DR 2-106 (B)(4).
33. See Morgan, supra note 1, at 710-11.
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recognition of the advantages of mediation and alternative dispute
resolution, the greater possibility of achieving the advantages of a
large firm without forming a large firm, and a reflective attitude on
the part of lawyers toward moral and philosophical concerns-a
greater awareness about what we as lawyers are doing and why we
are behaving as we are.
The final question is what can one do about professionalism?
That is always a difficult problem-the profession is so large and
we lawyers are each so small. On the other hand, a man named
Robert J. Kutak accomplished more for professionalism than al-
most anyone I know in the course of his all too short life. Bob
Kutak came from Omaha, Nebraska, which few think of as the
birthplace of national leaders. He was a successful lawyer there,
and he became the Chair of the Committee on Evaluation of Pro-
fessional Standards without any real expectation that he was going
to have a lot of impact on the legal profession. He was simply a
man who looked hard and seriously at the question of the state of
the profession and asked what one person or one group of individ-
uals could do. Those who saw Bob Kutak in action and observed
the product he produced recognize that he symbolizes what one
individual can accomplish. Certainly, as lawyers, each of us can
have an impact in our own states and communities if we are willing
to try. Even if we do not have the nationwide impact of Bob
Kutak, at the very least, we can remember and practice the admo-
nition of Canon 32 quoted earlier:
No client, corporate or individual, however powerful, nor any cause,
civil or political, however important, is entitled to receive nor should
any lawyer render any service or advice involving disloyalty to the
law whose ministers we are, or disrespect of the judicial office, which
we are bound to uphold, or corruption of any person or persons ex-
ercising a public office or private trust, or deception or betrayal of
the public .... But, above all, a lawyer will find [his or her] highest
honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to
public duty, as an honest [person] and as a patriotic and loyal
citizen.34
It is an old-fashioned idea expressed in old-fashioned terms, but
it is not a bad credo for us today.
34. CANONS, supra note 6, Canon 32.
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